Correspondence
Email sent to Stove Boat Communications which handles press for Lund’s Fisheries.
The email described abuses on a jigger owned by Rongcheng Wangdao, including the death of one crew member and disembarkation of a second for medical care after mistreatment on board, and multiple indicators of forced labor among the ship’s crew. It then traced squid from that ship to Lund’s via transshipments to fishery companies whose processors are in its supply chain.
Bob Vanasse of Stove Boat Communications responded by phone and email to convey Lund’s interest in discussing the findings of The Outlaw Ocean Project’s investigation, and the company’s multifaceted efforts to ensure their supply chain is free of illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing and human rights violations.
Bob Vanasse at Stoveboat Communications emailed to say he has been working with Lunds on looking into the information The Outlaw Ocean Project sent last week. He added: “We need another day or two, but I anticipate they will want to respond. Thank you for reaching out on this matter." He also arranged a group call between senior Lund's management and members of The Outlaw Ocean Project's investigative team.
Eight members of staff from Lund’s and three from The Outlaw Ocean Project had a group video call. The Outlaw Ocean Project discussed the findings of the investigation into China’s distant-water squid fishing fleet. Lund’s said that the squid they received from Chishan was only sourced from Spanish- or Agentinian-flagged vessels, while the squid that is processed for them at Zhonglu is squid that Lund’s caught in U.S. waters, freezes at their facility, and then sends over to China for processing and to be exported back to Lund's. The company also said they have two people working full-time for them in China, one of whom goes back and forth between the different processors to inspect conditions for them on-site. Lund’s also discussed the difficulties for them and similar companies as regards having full visibility on what happens on Chinese ships, given the lack of oversight bodies on that specific issue. Lund staff said they were interested in engaging with The Outlaw Ocean Project in working on the wording of their submission regarding the potential expansion of the U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program to include squid.
Following the video call on January 23, 2023, The Outlaw Ocean Project sent written questions to Lund’s regarding traceability and sourcing, asking: Beyond your catch certificates, do you have any other way of knowing that comingling isn’t happening at the reefer level? What specific steps has Lund's taken to identify and mitigate human rights risks connected to your suppliers?
Wayne Reichle, President of Lund’s, replied with details about the certifications Lund's uses in vetting its suppliers and supplied materials, and the supplier declaration it requires of its suppliers. He also included information on China’s new catch labeling system, writing: “In January 2021, China customs required exporters to not only label exterior cartons but also label the plastic bag or block within the carton. While this created financial costs for many processors, it provides traceability to the individual block level.”
The Outlaw Ocean Project sent additional details on the findings of the squid investigation as well as some follow-up questions to Lund's, particularly concerning Lund’s efforts to vet potential labor issues at supplier ship level.
Wayne Reichle of Lund’s replied with detailed answers to the questions and requested additional specific details on The Outlaw Ocean Project’s findings regarding suspected transshipments with Chishan Group reefers during AIS transmission gaps and vessels implicated in illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing. He also sent a separate email that day regarding Lund’s understanding of the Rongcheng Chishan Ocean Fishery Company's fishing operations being "a number of jigger and trawl vessels in addition to 1 small, low horse power freight vessel that does not participate in distant fisheries".
The Outlaw Ocean Project replied with specific named examples of squid jiggers with a history of transmission gaps which have transhipped with Chishan reefers, plus information on the reefers themselves. The email also asked two, more general, questions about Lund's views on tackling illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing and labor issues: Could you please tell us what Lund’s is most proud of doing to date regarding labor and illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing? What additional tools do you wish there were in addressing concerns specifically related to human rights and labor?
The Outlaw Ocean Project emailed Lund's management team outlining evidence showing that the company's supplier Rongcheng Haibo received Uyghur laborers under China's state-sponsored labor transfor program. The email said: "This evidence includes materials produced by the Chishan Group about meetings between high-level management (including Haibo management) and the officials who run the labor transfer program, as well as documentation about persons from Xinjiang working at Haibo. The Chishan Group has written publicly about the use of such labor in newsletters available on their Chinese-language website. We have evidence that shows Uyghurs at the plant as recently as May 2023." The email also said that under U.S. law, goods produced in part or full using Uyghur forced labor is not allowed to be imported to the U.S., and asked for comment.
Wayne Reichle, President of Lund's replied, saying: "It is difficult for us to comment on your allegations without any factual information being supplied from your investigation. As previously discussed, our suppliers are meeting our company’s supplier standards which exceeds U.S. import regulations."
The Outlaw Ocean Project replied, saying: "We’re not in a position to provide documentation, but we can say that the materials referenced in our previous email were produced and published by Chishan companies themselves since 2021, in Chinese. They include details on meetings involving Rongcheng Haibo, the Chishan Group, and the persons and agencies that operate the Xinjiang labor transfer programs." The email also asked if Lund's could disclose who carried out the SMETA audit of Haibo that Lund's mentioned previously.
Lund’s CEO Wayne Reichle provided a letter and statement to The Outlaw Ocean Project’s publishing partner, The New Yorker, saying that on receiving The New Yorker’s inquiry, Lund’s “took steps to research a thorough and accurate response, including assigning a Lund's Fisheries employee to look specifically into the question raised by Outlaw Oceans related to Rongcheng Haibo.” The statement said that some of the Chishan Group newsletter material referenced by The Outlaw Ocean Project contained an error and should have referred to a different company in the same industrial park as Haibo, but to which Haibo has no connection. The statement added: “Lund’s Fisheries has worked with Rongcheng Haibo for ten years, and the firm has consistently passed required SMETA audits. Our investigation did not find any evidence of illegal activity or forced labor in the operations of Rongcheng Haibo.” Lund’s also enclosed a statement from Rongcheng Haibo dated June 22, 2023, in which the company denied ever employing Xinjiang workers.
The Outlaw Ocean Project emailed Lund's and Rongcheng Haibo with further information and questions in response to their email to The New Yorker. The Outlaw Ocean Project's email said:
"Thank you for your letter dated October 6, 2023, and for continuing to engage with regard to our ongoing investigation.
We have been in ongoing conversation with Lund’s since January 23, 2023, when we had a Zoom meeting with the company’s CEO and seven of its staff, during which we explained our findings and methodology, and fielded your questions. In the subsequent eight months, we replied fully to your company’s emails seeking further input from us, and sent you additional questions. We took a similar approach with Haibo, which we contacted by registered letter on February 2, 2023, to detail our initial findings and in which we began asking questions. Throughout our investigation, we have given stakeholders in the industry and tied to our investigation ample time, typically weeks or months, to look into the matters we have been uncovering.
As we explained to Lund’s previously, we cannot provide the exact documents or source names behind various pieces of evidence because to do so runs the risk that the relevant company in China and/or authorities tied to the Chinese state will alter or remove the specific evidence that we are using before (or after) we can complete our investigation. There is also a risk to some of our sources inside China.
Your October 6 letter says that you only began your investigation into the issues we raised when you were contacted by The New Yorker. However, in our Zoom meeting and in your subsequent emails, including one on June 26, 2023, you confirmed that you were investigating the matters that we brought to your attention. The Haibo statement that you enclosed in your October 6 letter is itself dated June 22, 2023.
Your October 6 letter also states that we declined to provide you with any information about the source of our evidence. However, we provided you with descriptions of the type and content of multiple pieces of evidence. Your October 6 letter quotes one of the examples of our evidence that we provided to you. In that reference, you cite our description of a Chishan Group newsletter that you took to be one from September 22, 2022, in which the company explicitly describes Haibo receiving Xinjiang workers. Haibo’s explanation of this - that the workers were in fact from another company entirely unconnected to the Chishan Group or Rongcheng Haibo - is simply not credible given the volume of evidence we have compiled.
Your October 6 letter establishes the extent of your relationship with Haibo and your reliance on SMETA audits for oversight of forced labor concerns at your processing partners. You write for instance: “Lund’s Fisheries has worked with Rongcheng Haibo for ten years, and the firm has consistently passed required SMETA audits. Our investigation did not find any evidence of illegal activity or forced labor in the operations of Rongcheng Haibo.” Thank you for clarifying these points.
Your October 6 letter says that the Chishan Group newsletter citing Xinjiang workers at their plant was incorrect due to a reporting error on the Chishan Group’s part. Again, the explanation provided is simply not credible. We must make clear that our evidence does not rest upon a single document, but on dozens of sources. We found articles in the state news media from 2021, in both Uyghur and Chinese, that describe government labor transfers to Rongcheng Haibo. Three newsletters published by the Chishan Group also describe the use of Xinjiang labor at Haibo, and also detail government labor transfers to Rongcheng Haibo. An additional four newsletters describe Xinjiang workers at other Chishan Group enterprises, including Shandong Haidu, another processing plant that exports to the United States. Detailed in these articles are high-level meetings in 2020 and 2021 between corporate executives, including Rongcheng Haibo senior management, and Chinese government representatives.
In February 2021, the Chishan Group published a newsletter in which an article celebrated the arrival of Xinjiang workers at Rongcheng Haibo. The article included an image of the workers arriving at the site.
In May 2021, a Chishan Group newsletter said the company had held meetings with government officials in which the transfer of additional laborers from Xinjiang was discussed. Present at the meeting was Haibo's general manager, as well as representatives of a Xinjiang Zhongtai Group subsidiary, a company on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List for "working with the government of Xinjiang to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor or receive forced labor or Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of Xinjiang." The article said the Chishan Group was "looking forward to the arrival of laborers from Xinjiang" and said that the meeting concluded with an agreement between the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Human Resources and Social Security Bureau and the Xinjiang Zhongtai Group subsidiary to facilitate the transfer of "qualified Xinjiang migrant workers to Chishan enterprises as soon as possible."
In October 2021, a representative of Kashgar’s Human Resources and Social Security Bureau and Shandong’s ‘Xinjiang Aid’ program visited Chishan Group to “investigate the employment environment” of the company, alongside a representative from a state-owned Kashgar company and Xu Wu, director of the Public Employment and Talent Service Center and member of the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Rongcheng. Xu Wu oversees the Xinjiang Aid Labor Service Workstation, located within the Shidao Management District, which has provided Xinjiang labor to Chishan Group as well as other Rongcheng seafood enterprises, according to state media.
In September 2022, a Chishan Group newsletter said that Rongcheng Haibo implemented special kitchen arrangements for Xinjiang workers.
In addition to this, four other newsletters reference the transfer and/or accommodation of Xinjiang workers at other Chishan Group companies, including Shandong Haidu, another major exporter to the United States. Again, the practice of cooperation with government authorities to facilitate the transfer of Xinjiang workers is described.
Beyond state media and company materials, we've obtained footage uploaded by Uyghurs to social media that shows them working at Rongcheng Haibo. Video clips uploaded by seven users between March 2022 and June 2023 depict scenes that are verifiably shot from within Rongcheng Haibo, and around the company compound, according to our analysis. The videos include images and clips of the Uyghurs in employee overalls on the processing plant floor.
There is also a clip of a Xinjiang worker at Rongcheng Haibo that was uploaded on the same day in 2022 that SGS undertook a SMETA audit of the site. Our evidence further indicates that social audits have consistently failed to detect Xinjiang labor at numerous Shandong seafood plants over a period of several years.
In December 2021, the United States signed into law the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act, which introduced a legal presumption that all imports produced “wholly or in part” from Xinjiang were derived from state-imposed forced labor. This presumption also applies to goods made with Uyghur and other ethnic minority labor transferred out of Xinjiang via government affiliated labor transfer programs.
In light of your input and additional disclosures, we have a number of follow-up questions for you.
Questions for Lund’s:
- You have previously disclosed that you hired two people to work full-time for you in China, inspecting the processing plants that export to Lund’s. Have you asked them for any insights on the issues we raised?
- Our email to Lund’s dated June 28, 2023, did not receive a reply. In it we asked about Lund’s requirement for all of its suppliers to comply with the SMETA standard. Can you disclose who carried out that SMETA audit of Haibo for Lund’s?
- Does Lund’s or any partners tied to its supply chain store any of its seafood at Rongcheng Hailong Cold Chain Co. Ltd.? Have they done so at any point in the past?
Questions for Rongcheng Haibo:
Your letter states: “At the same time, we reiterate once again that Rongcheng Haibo Seafood Co., Ltd has never employed any Xinjiang workers.”
- Can you explain the February 2021 Chishan Group article that celebrated the arrival of Xinjiang workers to the Haibo company and included an image of the workers arriving?
- Can you explain why the Haibo Company was party to an agreement with Xinjiang Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Region Human Resources and the Zhongtai Company to receive Xinjiang workers in May 2021?
- Can you explain why, as detailed in a September 2022 Chishan Group article, the Haibo Company implemented special kitchen arrangements for Xinjiang workers, if it did not employ Xinjiang workers?
- Can you provide an explanation why at least seven workers from Xinjiang took at least 20 videos from inside and outside the Haibo processing plant, including images of them on the processing plant floor in employee overalls, if they were not working at Haibo?
- Can you tell us how many Xinjiang workers were transferred to work at other companies owned by the Chishan Group, such as Shandong Haidu? This process is described in multiple newsletters published by the Chishan Group.
- Does the Chishan Group or its subsidiaries store any of its seafood at Rongcheng Hailong Cold Chain Co. Ltd.? Have they done so at any point in the past?
Thank you for your prompt attention. If you could please get us replies by October 20, 2023, it would be helpful."
In a press statement on October 13, 2023, Lund's announced:
"In light of recent articles presented in the media naming 98 seafood companies, including Lund's Fisheries, Lund's Fisheries would like to issue a statement condemning IUU fishing as well as human right violations.
CAPE MAY, NJ / ACCESSWIRE / October 13, 2023 / Lund's Fisheries takes allegations of this type seriously, which is why we engaged in numerous productive discussions with Ian Urbina and the staff of the Outlaw Ocean Project beginning in January 2023. In good faith, we conscientiously shared documentation, procedures, policies and industry knowledge surrounding domestic and international fishing, foreign processing and imports. We will continue to address Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing, and forced labor allegations with industry members, NGOs, and our government to strengthen the seafood supply chain and provide consumers with the utmost confidence.
Upon hearing questions and criticisms raised about Rongcheng Haibo, we initiated an internal investigation, and resolved not to renew existing contracts with Rongcheng Haibo until that work was complete. Although our investigation did not find any evidence of illegal activity or forced labor in the operations of Roncheng Haibo Seafood, we are maintaining our cessation of new business pending further investigation.
Lund's Fisheries requires a Sedex Members Ethical Trade Audit (SMETA) from all of our foreign suppliers. SMETA is the world's most widely used audit in assessing standards of labor, health and safety, environmental performance, and ethics. The SMETA audit is designed to help protect workers from unsafe conditions, overwork, discrimination, low pay, and forced labor. The SMETA process is what companies use to evaluate their suppliers, specifically when referring to forced labor risks. In addition, we also engage with each supplier, requiring that they sign a supplier declaration agreement, wherein they must agree to not employ forced labor. We analyze and evaluate all the documentation they provide to us, including their SMETA audit reports, annually, to verify the results.
As a proud member of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership's Global Squid Supply Chain Roundtable, Lund's Fisheries is committed to working towards sustainable fisheries and combatting IUU fishing and human rights violations globally.
Lund's Fisheries is a family owned and operated, vertically integrated seafood harvester and processor which operates 19 fishing vessels on the East and West Coast of the United States and 5 seafood processing facilities in New Jersey, Massachusetts, and California. Our US plants produce a variety of Marine Stewardship Council-certified whole and cleaned calamari products, sea scallops, and multiple species of finfish.
Lund's Fisheries will celebrate our 70th anniversary next year. Our relationships with our customers, employees, consumers and partners are our first priority, and we take great pride in maintaining the integrity of what we do each day."
Wayne Reichle, President of Lund’s Fisheries, emailed a response:
"I am writing in response to your email of October 8, 2023, which asked questions regarding our response to the inquiry from the New Yorker magazine fact checking department.
Our October 6 letter was written to the New Yorker, in response to their fact-checking inquiry. It was not directed to, nor was it a response to the Outlaw Ocean Project. It is a mischaracterization to infer that we “only began [our] investigation into the issues [Outlaw Ocean Project] raised when [we] were contacted by The New Yorker.” What we said in that letter is we began our investigation into the New Yorker’s fact-checking questions at that time. After our first conversations in January, and prior to receiving Susan Ryan’s email of June 20, 2023, we had several conversations with Haibo based on the IUU allegations raised by the Outlaw Ocean Project.
Susan Ryan’s email on June 20, 2023, was not following up on the previous IUU allegations, but raised new issues alleging forced Uyghur labor in Haibo’s factory. We immediately questioned Haibo. They responded with the June 22, 2023, letter which we included in our response to the New Yorker. The Haibo statement we supplied to the New Yorker was issued two days after we inquired about Susan’s email. We did not consider it appropriate to share that private response publicly at that time.
You wrote that our “October 6 letter also states that we declined to provide you with any information about the source of our evidence.” To clarify, we did not say that. We said that “when we asked to review information from their investigation, she responded that they were ‘not in a position to provide documentation.’”
Susan’s response to our request on June 28 stated “We’re not in a position to provide documentation, but we can say that the materials referenced in our previous email were produced and published by Chishan companies themselves since 2021, in Chinese. They include details on meetings involving Rongcheng Haibo, the Chishan Group, and the persons and agencies that operate the Xinjiang labor transfer programs.”
You wrote “we provided you with descriptions of the type and content of multiple pieces of evidence.” That is correct, you told us you had evidence, but did not provide any. We were not offered any specific evidence by Outlaw Ocean Project, only descriptions of content. Given the fact that we are strongly opposed to working with anyone using forced labor, we immediately questioned Rongcheng Haibo about the “descriptions of the type and content of multiple pieces of evidence” you referenced and the use of forced labor in their factories. But without any specific evidence, it was difficult to impossible for us to evaluate the allegations raised.
Because this is such a serious matter, despite not having concrete proof of your allegations, we made the decision to cease conducting business with Rongcheng Haibo.
When the New Yorker fact-checking department reached out, we dispatched an employee to China, and we informed Rongcheng Haibo that we would include their June 22 letter, with their explanation, in our response.
In your October 6 email, you stated that Rongcheng Haibo’s explanation, “that the workers were in fact from another company entirely unconnected to the Chishan Group or Rongcheng Haibo - is simply not credible given the volume of evidence we have compiled.” And you then proceeded to outline a much longer list of allegations, quoted below, that were not included in Susan Ryan’s June emails.
• We must make clear that our evidence does not rest upon a single document, but on dozens of sources. We found articles in the state news media from 2021, in both Uyghur and Chinese, that describe government labor transfers to Rongcheng Haibo. Three newsletters published by the Chishan Group also describe the use of Xinjiang labor at Haibo, and also detail government labor transfers to Rongcheng Haibo. An additional four newsletters describe Xinjiang workers at other Chishan Group enterprises, including Shandong Haidu, another processing plant that exports to the United States. Detailed in these articles are high-level meetings in 2020 and 2021 between corporate executives, including Rongcheng Haibo senior management, and Chinese government representatives.
• In February 2021, the Chishan Group published a newsletter in which an article celebrated the arrival of Xinjiang workers at Rongcheng Haibo. The article included an image of the workers arriving at the site.
• In May 2021, a Chishan Group newsletter said the company had held meetings with government officials in which the transfer of additional laborers from Xinjiang was discussed. Present at the meeting was Haibo's general manager, as well as representatives of a Xinjiang Zhongtai Group subsidiary, a company on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List for "working with the government of Xinjiang to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor or receive forced labor or Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of Xinjiang." The article said the Chishan Group was "looking forward to the arrival of laborers from Xinjiang" and said that the meeting concluded with an agreement between the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Human Resources and Social Security Bureau and the Xinjiang Zhongtai Group subsidiary to facilitate the transfer of "qualified Xinjiang migrant workers to Chishan enterprises as soon as possible."
• In October 2021, a representative of Kashgar’s Human Resources and Social Security Bureau and Shandong’s ‘Xinjiang Aid’ program visited Chishan Group to “investigate the employment environment” of the company, alongside a representative from a state owned Kashgar company and Xu Wu, director of the Public Employment and Talent Service Center and member of the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Rongcheng. Xu Wu oversees the Xinjiang Aid Labor Service Workstation, located within the Shidao Management District, which has provided Xinjiang labor to Chishan Group as well as other Rongcheng seafood enterprises, according to state media.
• In September 2022, a Chishan Group newsletter said that Rongcheng Haibo implemented special kitchen arrangements for Xinjiang workers.
• In addition to this, four other newsletters reference the transfer and/or accommodation of Xinjiang workers at other Chishan Group companies, including Shandong Haidu, another major exporter to the United States. Again, the practice of cooperation with government authorities to facilitate the transfer of Xinjiang workers is described.
• Beyond state media and company materials, we've obtained footage uploaded by Uyghurs to social media that shows them working at Rongcheng Haibo. Video clips uploaded by seven users between March 2022 and June 2023 depict scenes that are verifiably shot from within Rongcheng Haibo, and around the company compound, according to our analysis. The videos include images and clips of the Uyghurs in employee overalls on the processing plant floor.
• There is also a clip of a Xinjiang worker at Rongcheng Haibo that was uploaded on the same day in 2022 that SGS undertook a SMETA audit of the site. Our evidence further indicates that social audits have consistently failed to detect Xinjiang labor at numerous Shandong seafood plants over a period of several years.
We received these additional detailed allegations literally just hours before the New Yorker stories were published, leaving no time for additional investigation. Our staff member who was sent to China, and who found no evidence of the earlier allegations, was already en route back to the United States.
We take these matters seriously. Although we have still not been presented with any actual evidence, given these allegations, and our commitment to always operate in the most ethical manner, we have cancelled all contracts with Rongcheng Haibo.
If you have the concrete evidence to back up these serious allegations, we trust you will find an appropriate way to bring the evidence to light without compromising your sources. You asked several other questions in your email.
• You asked who carried out that SMETA audit of Rongcheng Haibo for Lund’s. We are contracted through Société Générale de Surveillance SA (SGS). As I’m sure you know, SGS, headquartered in Geneva is a century-old global testing, inspection, and certification company, and is considered a leader in the field.
• You asked if our full-time employees in China had any insights on the allegations you raised. Our Chinese representatives are engaged to monitor and ensure quality control of the goods being processed. They are neither charged with nor qualified to perform social audits. We rely on recognized and respected third parties to facilitate social audits, and contract through SGS.
• You asked if Lund’s Fisheries stores any of its seafood at Rongcheng Hailong Cold Chain Co. Ltd. We do not store anything there, and we would not know if Rongcheng Haibo does, or does not.
• You asked several other questions that would be appropriately directed to Rongcheng Haibo. We do not speak for other companies, nor is it appropriate for us to respond to allegations directed at other companies.
Lund's Fisheries takes these allegations seriously, which is why we engaged in discussions with you and the staff of the Outlaw Ocean Project beginning in January 2023. In good faith, we shared documentation, procedures, policies, and industry knowledge surrounding domestic and international fishing, foreign processing, and imports. Lund’s Fisheries will continue to address Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing, and forced labor allegations with industry members, NGOs, and our government to strengthen the seafood supply chain and provide consumers with the utmost confidence."
The Outlaw Ocean Project emailed Lund's with further information and questions in response to their October 20 email:
"I’m writing in response to your letter of October 20, 2023, which informed us that you have severed ties with Haibo on the heels of the evidence we presented to you pertaining to the existence of forced labor in Rongcheng Haibo, which was previously a part of your supply chain. Thank you for continuing to engage. Your willingness to answer difficult questions has been distinct within the industry and seems to show a genuine desire to confront and correct admittedly very challenging problems facing the global seafood supply chain.
Allow me to start by trying to ensure that we are using the same set of terminology. In your letter, you seemed to use the words, “allegations” and “evidence” interchangeably. What we provided you in our letter of October 8, 2023, was not additional allegations but a detailed summary of the supporting evidence. Our core allegation has been fairly straightforward and consistent: Chinese processing plants tied to Lund’s have within the past five years used Xinjiang workers in seeming violation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. With regard to your mention that you were not provided “specific evidence,” we itemized quite extensively the various forms of proof that Xinjiang workers have in recent years been in the Haibo plant. We are fairly certain that the details that we provided to you and your then-supplier Haibo were specific enough that your staff in China and Haibo could take a look at the items rendered and decide whether you still believe, as you previously said, that there is no “evidence of illegal activity or forced labor,” and as Haibo said, it “has never employed any Xinjiang workers.” Our investigation is ongoing and as we find new materials of these same issues at this or other plants, we will continue to engage you and describe as best we are able the nature of our findings.
Regarding documents, footage or other evidentiary materials gathered in our investigation: I fear that we can not provide materials upon request, privately or piecemeal. Everything we have to offer we are publishing for the full public and on our website. This is important (and the norm) for journalism venues, as you know. It is also essential in the case of this investigation because several law enforcement agencies are working through the evidence presently and they prefer to view materials in their original. Items that we mined from the Chinese internet (corporate newsletters, open-source footage, state media reports, etc) have been saved by us. But these agencies prefer to access such evidentiary materials in their original. If we reveal or publish some of these items, the companies or the government are likely to remove them from the internet and that will undermine the actions being planned by these law enforcement agencies. Our investigation is ongoing and we will publish everything we possibly can on the website and via our partner news outlets around the world.
With regard to our question concerning, “who carried out that SMETA audit of Rongcheng Haibo for Lund’s,” you replied that it was SGS, which you emphasized is a “leader in the field.” So that we can see whether this audit checked for the existence of Xinjiang labor, may we please have a copy of it? As I’m sure you’re aware, the investigation found: “In May, 2022, social auditors from SGS, one of the top auditing firms, completed an inspection of Haibo, and American companies continued to import its products. But, when we investigated the matter, we found that more than a hundred and seventy people from Xinjiang worked at Haibo in 2021, and a half-dozen Uyghur workers posted regularly to Douyin at Haibo throughout 2022. On the same day that the auditors toured, a young Uyghur worker posted pictures of herself near the plant’s loading bays and what seem to be its dormitories. (Wayne Reichle, the president of Lund’s, told me, ‘Our suppliers are meeting our company’s supplier standards, which exceed U.S. import regulations.’ A spokesperson said that the company has begun to investigate the matter….)When pressed, an SGS representative said that the auditors had done what was required of them by Sedex’s methodology.”
That there was footage of Xinjiang workers within this plant and that social audits such as those performed by SGS seem to be overlooking the presence of state-sponsored forced labor as defined by the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, would seem to beg a larger question: Is Lund’s confident that the audits it is using are sufficient to protect the company from the presence of state-sponsored forced labor from Xinjiang, or other forms, for example, from North Korea?
With regard to your explanation that your own on-site staff in China are “neither charged with nor qualified to perform social audits,” and that for social audits you rely entirely on SGS, we wonder what social audit steps Lund’s is taking to discern labor conditions on the fishing vessels themselves from which the company sources?
With regard to your statement that you will not answer several of the questions that we posed concerning forced labor in your supplier, Rongcheng Haibo, and your statement that we need to ask that supplier, we find this response somewhat perplexing. To be clear, our questions previously presented to you are focused on your knowledge of conditions within a processing plant that you have verified was supplying your company with seafood and because of that relationship, make questions about forced labor within that plant a core concern for Lund’s – at least that is my understanding from your explanation for why you have since decided to sever ties with Haibo. For this reason, the questions we posed to you about the presence of forced labor within a major processing plant that until quite recently was central to your supply chain would seem to be best answered by you. It would seem to me that you either are taking responsibility for concerns about forced labor within plants that are part of your supply chain, or you are not taking responsibility for what happens within those plants, and as such are referring questions to them.
Thank you for your further reassurance that you intend to continue to be transparent and open to what we can only imagine are difficult questions. Even though Lund’s has provided some information and responses, part of the purpose of the investigation and this conversation is to press for more rigor and clarity regarding some of the clear blindspots that seem to exist in the way that companies like Lund’s may have until recently been handling the challenges that exist within the seafood industry to counter the problem of IUU and forced labor on fishing ships and in processing plants."