Correspondence
Email sent to Jackie Marks, Senior Public Relations Manager.
The email asked if Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification considers labor issues or is entirely sustainability focused, and if it can cover Chinese fishing ships as well as processors.
Jackie Marks of the MSC replied, saying to “keep in mind that there are two Standards that MSC owns – the Fisheries Standard, and the Chain of Custody Standard. The former applies to fishing operations, and the latter applies to everything once the fish is landed.” She said that the MSC Fisheries Standard is an environmental standard focused on sustainable fishing, but that since 2014 any fishing vessels prosecuted for forced labor violations in the previous two years are excluded from the certification program. She added: “To improve transparency, MSC fisheries and at-sea supply chain businesses have had to publicly report on their labor practices since 2018. Certified supply chain businesses that undertake processing, packing and manual off-load must undergo an independent third-party labor audit, or submit a self-assessment report to MSC and allow MSC to commission its own independent audit.” She also said that Chain of Custody certification applies to everything after the fish has been landed, so no, the certification does not apply to fishing vessels
The Outlaw Ocean Project emailed Jackie Marks of the MSC, asking: 1) How many independent labor audits of Chinese processing plants have been submitted to MSC in the past 3 years? 2) Which plants and companies have conducted those audits during the same period? 3) How often in the past 3 years has MSC commissioned its own labor audits of these plants and which plants did MSC target for such audits? 4) Did any of the plants receive a failing or low score in the audit and what were the consequences of such failing/low scores?
Jackie Marks at the MSC replied that she needed to pass the query to one of her colleagues who is familiar with this topic, keeping the deadline in mind.
Jackie Marks at the MSC replied that much of the information being sought is confidential and the MSC is unable to share details, but she could provide some specific points of clarification, including that certificate holders are required to provide evidence to their auditor, or Conformity Assessment Body (CAB), not to the MSC as it is a third-party system.
The Outlaw Ocean Project asked the MSC: Are the self-assessments and recognized social audit schemes required by the MSC designed to identify migrant workers present at sites, including persons belonging to vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities from the Chinese province of Xinjiang and North Koreans?
Jackie Marks replied for the MSC: “The audits MSC recognizes (SMETA, BSCI, SA8000 BRCGS) are all designed to consider all workers regardless of if they are local, or if they are migrants. In recognition of the particular vulnerabilities that migrants might face, the standards and audit programs include special consideration of efforts to mitigate risk to migrants regardless of their country and place of operation.”
The Outlaw Ocean Project emailed to clarify whether the self-declaration system is also designed to identify if vulnerable workers (such as those from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or North Korea) are working at a particular plant. The email received an ‘out of office’ reply.
The Outlaw Ocean Project emailed other contact addresses at the MSC’s media team, asking if the MSC could clarify whether each of 11 named Chinese seafood processing plants undertook third party social audits or completed MSC-commissioned audits after submitting MSC Chain of Custody Labour Self-Assessment Forms. The email also asked the MSC to indicate whether these audits and self-assessments identified the presence of workers deployed through the Chinese government's XUAR labor transfer program.
The Outlaw Ocean Project emailed additional questions to Jackie Marks, including: Does the MSC expect the self-assessment to identify migrant workers, including those from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and North Korea? Does the MSC commission an audit at every site which opts for self-assessment or do you apply some kind of selection criteria meaning that some CoC-certified sites may not undergo social audit?
Jo Miller, Head of Public Relations at the MSC emailed, saying that the organization is taking this matter extremely seriously, and checking if it would be possible to have a conversation by phone to provide some context on the MSC’s work in China and so that the MSC can better understand what The Outlaw Ocean Project’s investigation has uncovered.
The Outlaw Ocean Project replied to say that members of the team would be available for a call but that it would need to remain on-the-record.
Jo Miller replied for the MSC: “I’m afraid we’re not at a point where we can give you an on the record briefing on this. We’d like the opportunity to discuss the background of your enquiry and to explain the MSC’s program to one of your team so that we can respond appropriately.
The Outlaw Ocean Project replied that the team could answer what we can in terms of questions from the MSC, but please understand that we're not in a position to offer details about our findings and methods, due to the sensitivity of the issues and the acute vulnerability of individuals concerned. The email included seven detailed questions on which The Outlaw Ocean Project was seeking insight from the MSC:
- Please could MSC clarify whether each of the processing plants named below undertook third party social audits or completed MSC-commissioned audits after submitting MSC Chain of Custody Labour Self-Assessment Forms?
- Did any of the audits or self-assessments of the below processing plants identify the presence of workers from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)?
- Question 6 of the MSC Chain of Custody Labour Self-Assessment Form requires companies to indicate whether migrant workers handle seafood products. Our investigation has found that workers deployed through coercive labor transfer programs from XUAR are referred to by both the Chinese government and Chinese seafood processing plants as "migrant workers". Does MSC expect the self-assessment to identify migrant workers from XUAR? Is MSC able to share a completed self-assessment form demonstrating that XUAR workers have been identified at any Chinese worksite?
- Does MSC commission a social audit at every site which opts for self-assessment? Do social audits commissioned by MSC adhere to the same auditable standards set out in the MSC Labour Eligibility Requirements policy?
- Does MSC retain copies of social audit reports and corrective action plans? If so, are MSC able to share any of these with us or at least confirm which auditing firms undertook social audits at the sites of interest?
- We recognise MSC have integrated social audits against widely-used auditable standards into your CoC certification in order to offer stronger assurance to your supply chain partners, and that the third party systems you've put in place in this regard aren't dissimilar to those adopted by numerous initiatives in other sectors across the world. Our findings indicate that social audits conducted against multiple standards over several years have consistently failed to detect Uyghur forced labor at 11 sites. In light of our findings, does MSC have any comment to make on the effectiveness of social audit as a means for surfacing forced labor generally, or on the suitability of social audit in detecting XUAR forced labor at Chinese worksites?
- We understand that MSC have recently undertaken a review of your social and labour policy requirements. Will the information provided to you by the Outlaw Ocean lead to any further review or changes to MSC policy?
Jo Miller of the MSC replied to acknowledge receipt of the questions and to ask about The Outlaw Ocean Project's Reporting.
The Outlaw Ocean Project replied: "We greatly appreciate your offer to talk, but on principle we think it’s best to stay on record and, ideally, in writing. We think it's really important that the MSC has a chance to offer its perspective and explain its approach to managing labor risks at CoC-certified sites, and we're trying to facilitate that, but it's important for our purposes that the exchange remain on record." The email also said that The Outlaw Ocean Project can't discuss wider findings or methodology at this point.
Jo Miller responded with answers from the MSC to the seven questions posed by The Outlaw Ocean Project regarding MSC-commissioned audits:
Our answers to your questions
- Please could MSC clarify whether each of the processing plants named below undertook third party social audits or completed MSC-commissioned audits after submitting MSC Chain of Custody Labour Self- Assessment Forms?
In the case of the companies identified in the report, seven had audits carried out by Sedex-approved auditors and four opted for self-assessment. Sedex’s audits are recognised globally and used by many leading businesses across many sectors – not just seafood - to help identify labour issues. Furthermore, one of the companies that carried out a self-assessment also had a random MSC commissioned social audit carried out by Elevate, a social compliance assessment company. None of these audits raised issues with forced labour.
- Did any of the audits or self-assessments of the below processing plants identify the presence of workers from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)?
No - it is not a requirement to identify migrants’ place of origin. The MSC self-assessments identify if migrant workers are employed and ask the percentage of these employed a) to handle seafood and b) who are on a temporary contract. These are global requirements, and not geared to an individual country or region. It is our understanding that while SMETA audits ask for nationality of workers there is no specific requirement to identify local migrants’ backgrounds under the SMETA audits.
- Question 6 of the MSC Chain of Custody Labour Self-Assessment Form requires companies to indicate whether migrant workers handle seafood products. Our investigation has found that workers deployed through coercive labor transfer programs from XUAR are referred to by both the Chinese government and Chinese seafood processing plants as "migrant workers".
Does MSC expect the self-assessment to identify migrant workers from XUAR? Is MSC able to share a completed self-assessment form demonstrating that XUAR workers have been identified at any Chinese worksite?
As above, MSC self-assessments do not request any certificate holder to identify the nationality or origin of their workers. See below for answer on confidentiality.
- Does MSC commission a social audit at every site which opts for self-assessment? Do social audits commissioned by MSC adhere to the same auditable standards set out in the MSC Labour Eligibility Requirements policy?
We select certificate holders for MSC commissioned labour audits based on a statistically random sample. One of the four sites which opted for self-assessment, one was selected for a random audit and this did not raise any issues with forced labour. The random audits can be carried out using one of the five identified providers[i] or another provider of which we approve. As these are relatively new requirements, we are trying to identify the best provider and tool to use, but the intention is the same: to identify whether there are any issues with forced labour.
- Does MSC retain copies of social audit reports and corrective action plans? If so, are MSC able to share any of these with us or at least confirm which auditing firms undertook social audits at the sites of interest?
We do not own the SMETA reports and therefore cannot share them with you. The reports belong to the companies which commissioned them. We only have access to them to verify that they meet MSC requirements. Furthermore, we believe there is an issue of confidentiality around the audit process, namely that it is important that those who take part can safely engage and report any issues, without feeling compromised. The labour audits were undertaken by Sedex-approved auditors as noted above. The MSC-commissioned audit was carried out by Elevate.
- We recognise MSC have integrated social audits against widely-used auditable standards into your CoC certification in order to offer stronger assurance to your supply chain partners, and that the third party systems you've put in place in this regard aren't dissimilar to those adopted by numerous initiatives in other sectors across the world. Our findings indicate that social audits conducted against multiple standards over several years have consistently failed to detect Uyghur forced labor at 11 sites. In light of our findings, does MSC have any comment to make on the effectiveness of social audit as a means for surfacing forced labor generally, or on the suitability of social audit in detecting XUAR forced labor at Chinese worksites?
The MSC’s consultation on social welfare identified five labour audit programs that are widely used throughout the world, by brands and supply chains and are regarded as providing credible assurance on labour issues. That said, we are very concerned about your findings and are keen to understand the evidence that they are based on. When we have sight of this, we will carefully consider the best action to deal with any issues that arise from your report and any improvements we need to make.
- We understand that MSC have recently undertaken a review of your social and labour policy requirements. Will the information provided to you by the Outlaw Ocean lead to any further review or changes to MSC policy?
MSC is an environmental NGO which developed and now maintains a standard for environmentally sustainable fishing together with a chain of custody standard to provide assurance that certified product is segregated from non-certified in the supply chain. Our eligibility requirements on forced labour are relatively new and we are open to seeing the evidence you provide, learning from others with more experience in this and carefully evaluating any improvements that might need to be made following our review of the evidence.
The Outlaw Ocean Project replied to the MSC, thanking them for the responses to the previous questions and sending some follow-up points for clarification:
-
Please could MSC specify which CoC-certified processing plants underwent audit (7 sites) and which plants carried out self-assessments (4 sites). For SMETA audited sites, please detail which auditing firms undertook the most recent audits and provide date of audit. For self-assessed sites, please provide the date of completion. Please also specify which processing plant underwent an MSC-commissioned audit by Elevate, and when this audit occured.
-
With regards to MSC self-assessments not identifying the origin of migrant workers, please could MSC clarify whether any of the self-assessed plants (4 sites) disclosed the presence of migrant workers? If yes, please identify the plants concerned.
-
Our understanding is that the Sedex self-assessment questionnaires (SAQ) which generally precede SMETA audit require sites to identify migrant workers, which includes internal migrants or people who have "migrated on a temporary basis to another in-country region" (according to Sedex's SAQ Glossary of Terms). In order to adequately plan for SMETA audit, Sedex also requires sites to specify the primary and secondary languages of all employees - on the understanding that auditors will seek to engage a representative sample of the workforce for interview, payroll review, etc per SMETA Best Practice Guidance. Please could you confirm [a] whether the Sedex SAQs for the audited plants (7 sites) identified Uyghur as a primary or secondary language of any employees and [b] whether the SMETA audit reports themselves identified the presence of any migrant workers at the factories? If yes, please identify the plants concerned.
-
Are we correct in our understanding of your response to question 3 below that three self-assessed CoC-certified sites haven't, to MSC's knowledge, undergone social audit? If yes, please identify the plants concerned.
Jo Miller responded for the MSC: “To provide context to these, in developing our programme for certified sustainable seafood, the MSC includes high levels of transparency, particularly in the assessment of fisheries, publishing all assessments, certification reports and audits on fisheries.msc.org. We recognise the importance of stakeholder consultation and allowing the open scrutiny of assessments. Our labour eligibility requirements for fisheries at sea require them to complete self-declarations on forced labour, which are also publicly available. However, for supply chain operations, certified to our Chain of Custody (COC) Standard, assessments include commercially sensitive information about details such as supplier contracts. Therefore, to ensure respect for the rights of certificate holders to confidentiality of their commercial information, and market support for sustainable fishing, the details of these reports are confidential. Additionally, we do not legally own the reports from third party labour audits and therefore are unable to share the data contained in them. Details within these reports are owned by the companies which commissioned them." The email included replies to each of the questions posed by The Outlaw Ocean Project in the July 6 email: "1. Please could MSC specify which CoC-certified processing plants underwent audit (7 sites) and which plants carried out self-assessments (4 sites). For SMETA audited sites, please detail which auditing firms undertook the most recent audits and provide date of audit. For self-assessed sites, please provide the date of completion. Please also specify which processing plant underwent an MSC-commissioned audit by Elevate, and when this audit occurred.
As we explained previously, MSC does not own the SMETA reports and therefore cannot share them or the data they contain with you. If you’d like to see the details in the SMETA reports, we suggest you request these directly from the companies. Self-assessments are part of the Chain of Custody assessment process and therefore confidential.
- With regards to MSC self-assessments not identifying the origin of migrant workers, please could MSC clarify whether any of the self-assessed plants (4 sites) disclosed the presence of migrant workers? If yes, please identify the plants concerned.
As above, self-assessments are part of the Chain of Custody assessment process and therefore confidential.
- Our understanding is that the Sedex self-assessment questionnaires (SAQ) which generally precede SMETA audit require sites to identify migrant workers, which includes internal migrants or people who have "migrated on a temporary basis to another in-country region" (according to Sedex's SAQ Glossary of Terms). In order to plan adequately for SMETA audit, Sedex also requires sites to specify the primary and secondary languages of all employees - on the understanding that auditors will seek to engage a representative sample of the workforce for interview, payroll review, etc per SMETA Best Practice Guidance. Please could you confirm [a] whether the Sedex SAQs for the audited plants (7 sites) identified Uyghur as a primary or secondary language of any employees and [b] whether the SMETA audit reports themselves identified the presence of any migrant workers at the factories? If yes, please identify the plants concerned.
This is a question for Sedex. As explained above, MSC does not own these reports and does not have permission to share the data they contain.
- Are we correct in our understanding of your response to question 3 below that three self-assessed CoC-certified sites haven't, to MSC's knowledge, undergone social audit? If yes, please identify the plants concerned.
This is a question for the companies involved. As above, we’re unable to provide specifics on the details of the self- assessments.
The Outlaw Ocean Project emailed suggesting that, given public interest, the MSC take the initiative in reconsidering the confidentiality issues that prevent fuller disclosure. The email posed one further question: In a context where seafood processors, buyers, social compliance firms, auditable standards holders and certification bodies collectively evade basic transparency about the effectiveness of their forced labor detection and prevention systems, does MSC believe its Chain of Custody certification offers any meaningful assurance on labor to seafood consumers?
The Outlaw Ocean Project emailed: “Thanks again for your engagement, your note on both issues is well-received. If MSC found that a certified processing plant was indeed using XUAR forced labor, under what grounds would you revoke CoC certification?”
Jo Miller replied for the MSC: “The conformity assessment bodies (CABs) responsible for certifying companies to our standards can suspend certificates if there is evidence that the company no longer complies with the MSC's requirements or when directed to do so by the MSC as a result of unacceptable conduct. Following an investigation and the opportunity for those involved to respond, the course of action taken by CABs and the MSC would be determined on a case by case basis depending on the strength of evidence and the gravity of the issues involved.” The email also emphasized that the exchanges to date with The Outlaw Ocean Project are reflective of the MSC’s position as an organization, rather than any one individual.
The Outlaw Ocean Project's publishing partner in Germany, Die Zeit, contacted the MSC office in Germany for comment on the investigation and the extent to which it is at all possible to restrict the import of problematically caught or processed fish from China and other countries.
Andrea Harmsen, PR Manager Germany/Austria/Switzerland, replied that as an environmental organization and voluntary certification program for sustainable fisheries, the MSC does not see itself in a position to contribute to the discussion on import restrictions or other regulatory or economic policy measures. She also outlined the two certification programs run by the MSC - one on sustainability (for fisheries) and one on traceability (for companies in the supply chain).
Die Zeit asked the MSC to answer specific questions about the issues raised in The Outlaw Ocean Project's investigation regarding traceability certs for factories where forced labor was identified, and comingling undermining traceability of catch back to vessel.
Andrea Harmsen, PR Manager Germany/Austria/Switzerland, replied that the MSC’s traceability standard requires companies certified to the MSC traceability standard to accurately record and document every entry and exit of MSC fish. The email added that annual inspections by independent auditors examine the company’s processes for the separation and identification of goods, including storage, processing, and comparing the weight of MSC fish purchased by the company against weight of sale. It also said that the certification standard establishes a fully documented supply chain for each MSC-labeled product.
Die Zeit emailed the MSC in Germany, saying that The Outlaw Ocean Project’s investigation found that specific companies had received MSC certification but were linked to problematic fishing practices and with forced labor in China. Specifically concerning the German market, Die Zeit asked the MSC whether and how it ensures that MSC-certified catch does not have problematic origins.
Andrea Harmsen, PR Manager Germany/Austria/Switzerland, replied that the MSC is primarily an environmental organization that promotes sustainable, environmentally compatible fishing of the seas, and none of the fisheries observed by The Outlaw Ocean Project, or addressed in Die Zeit’s report, are MSC certified. She added that the certification of processing plants according to the MSC traceability standard means that a fish product bearing the MSC seal is very likely to actually contain fish from a sustainable, MSC-certified fishery. This also applies to all MSC-labeled fish products available in Germany. Her email continued that with the MSC’s recent introduction of an additional requirement for processing plants to be audited by an external, independent and internationally recognized social standard setter, such as SEDEX, the organization aims to support industry-wide efforts to reduce forced labor risk in the supply chain, and it is now concerned about the demonstrated limitations of this independent verification.
The Outlaw Ocean Project provided the following information regarding the investigation's findings to Die Zeit, for sharing with the MSC in Germany: “The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) operates two certification programs: one is focused on sustainable fisheries and fishing practices, and the other concerns the chain of custody after catch has been landed. Seafood plants are certified under the MSC’s Chain of Custody Standard. The MSC itself says of this: “The Standard ensures an unbroken chain where certified seafood is identifiable, segregated and can be traced back to another certified business. This system allows businesses and consumers to be confident that seafood with the blue MSC label has come from a fishery certified as sustainable.” (Our investigation, however, found that behaviors like transshipment at sea to reefers or to other fishing boats raise questions about the reliability of traceability of catch from vessel to plant.)
Here are a list of the plants the investigation found tied to Uyghur forced labor and their relevant MSC certification number: Qingdao Lian Yang Aquatic Products Co. Ltd. MSC-C-50870 Qingdao Tianyuan Aquatic Products Co. Ltd. MSC-C-52638 Rizhao Jiayuan Foodstuff Co. Ltd. MSC-C-56475 Rizhao Meijia Keyuan Foods Co. Ltd. MSC-C-53370 Rizhao Rirong Aquatic Products Co. Ltd. MSC-C-55351 Rizhao Rongxing Food Co. Ltd. MSC-C-53499 Rongcheng Haibo Ocean Food Co. Ltd. MSC-C-59738 Shandong Haidu Ocean Food Co. Ltd. MSC-C-57659 Yantai Longwin Foods Co. Ltd. MSC-C-51481 Yantai Sanko Fisheries Co. Ltd. MSC-C-51794
The MSC has made some efforts to incorporate concerns about forced labor and child labor into its certification programs over the last decade, as it outlines on its website, but it does rely on self-assessment by the companies themselves (meaning the ones who want to be certified) and audits by third parties that may not be designed to find the kind of forced labor that China’s Uyghur population is subjected to.
Our correspondence with the MSC can be found in the Discussion tool. The Findings page includes a portion on the 'Failure of Private Sector Safeguards' which gives more detail on the auditing gaps concerning forced labor in seafood factories. There’s also a whole section on auditing in the Solutions page which includes issues regarding the Marine Stewardship Council and which you may find useful.”
Email sent to Jackie Marks for the MSC, saying: "Our ongoing investigation into the use of forced labor in China’s seafood processing industry has uncovered evidence of North Koreans working in more seafood plants in Liaoning province. Some of these plants are currently MSC certified: Dandong Yuanyi Refined Seafoods, Dandong Taifeng Foodstuff, Donggang Jinhui Foodstuff and Donggang Haimeng Foodstuff. We understand from our previous engagements with the MSC that social audits or a self-assessment of labor practices are a precursor for MSC chain-of-custody certifications for plants. Do you have insights on why North Korean workers inside the plants have not been, or are not being, identified through these audits?
We are also seeking a response from the MSC on each of the following: 1) Our investigation found that social audits have not been checking directly and explicitly for the two most widespread forms of state-sponsored forced labor in China (Xinjiang and North Korean), both of which have stand alone US laws tied to them (UFLPA and CATSA). Does the MSC have any plans or proposals on how to tackle this? 2) We have heard that there is a lack of unannounced audits at Chinese processing plants because auditors face pressure from the Chinese government over unannounced spot checks. Doesn't the lack of unannounced audits undermine the reliability of the current auditing system? 3) Audits at processing plants only go to a limited depth in terms of the supply chain and do not check for violations on or by the ships supplying those plants - an ongoing blind spot in which at-sea human rights abuses and IUU occur. How can the seafood industry in general, and certification bodies like the MSC in particular, plug this gap? As ever, we appreciate the MSC’s engagement on the issues raised in our research and reporting."
Jackie Marks replied for the MSC: "Thank you for your email and details of your continuing investigation. We understand that the focus of your continued investigation is on social audits. In our previous email correspondence with you, we explained the role of independent third-party social audits in determining whether a seafood processor is eligible for inclusion in MSC’s Chain of Custody program. I would be grateful if you could refer to this correspondence, in relation to your current queries. You ask about at-sea conditions. As we said in previous correspondence, the MSC is an environmental not-for-profit. Our goal is to end overfishing – a huge and complex challenge facing our ocean and the MSC’s Fishery Standard is founded on environmental requirements. We make no claims about setting standards on labor. However, we do recognize the importance of this issue and we continue to explore how we can work with others to address it in global supply chains."
"Thanks for your email. We know the MSC is an environmental organization, but it also mandates prerequisite social audits as part of the MSC’s certification process for processing plants. Clearly those audits have not been successful at identifying Xinjiang or North Korean workers. Does that present a problem for the MSC? Does the MSC have any concerns that the social audits are not identifying Xinjiang or North Korean labor in Chinese seafood processing plants that are certified by the MSC? Has the MSC raised questions with relevant auditing bodies about the fitness for purpose of the audit programs currently in place? How is MSC engaging with auditing bodies to make the necessary changes such that auditors are better prepared to identify these forms of state-sanctioned forced labor?" The email also included a link to the 'Discussion' tool on The Outlaw Ocean Project's website cataloging the dialogue with the MSC to date.
The Outlaw Ocean Project's publishing partner, The New Yorker, sent the following query to the MSC ahead of publication: "I'm writing from the fact checking department at The New Yorker, where I'm working with the writer Ian Urbina on an upcoming piece about North Korean labor in China. The piece discusses the use of social audits, mentioning the Marine Stewardship Council, and I wanted to run a few things by you. Could you please let me know by EOD Tuesday, Feb. 20, if there are any inaccuracies, and if you would like to comment on anything? Thanks very much.
- Marine Stewardship Council grants certification to companies if they have passed social audits or other types of assessments.
- You told Ian's team that the social audits are conducted by a third party, not by MSC itself.
- You said that the MSC makes no claims about setting standards on labor.
- You are the head of public relations at MSC."
Susannah Henty, Senior PR Manager at the MSC, sent the following email to The Outlaw Ocean Project's publishing partner, The New Yorker:
"Thanks for getting in touch. As Jackie isn’t working this email got forwarded to me, I work in the MSC’s global team. Can you tell me when this story is coming out?
You are correct we liaised with Ian’s research team, but we shared quite a bit of additional context and some of this isn’t quite right in the editing.
Your first line/Q1 isn’t accurate, because it misunderstands our role. The MSC is an environmental not-for profit organisation, and our ecolabel indicates that seafood comes from an ecologically sustainable fishery. However, the MSC as an organisation does not ‘grant certification’, we set the standards. Gaining environmental performance or chain of custody certification is decided by accredited Conformity Assessment Bodies (CABs), organisations independent to the MSC which carry out detailed assessments to score fisheries, using data and evidence, related to the MSC Standard’s requirements.
Whilst Q3 is correct, we don’t set standards on labor, in response to Q2 and 3, you need to understand MSC’s ‘Labour Eligibility Requirements’. This means that since 2014, if a company is convicted of forced labour, they are not eligible for our programme. In 2019, we introduced requirements that some certified supply chain companies – such as processors and packing companies - must either provide a valid labour audit from credible and independent third-party provider or provide a self-assessment against a designated set of criteria. If they opt for a self-assessment, they must also allow MSC to commission a labour audit, if called upon to do so, at any time. This is an eligibility requirement they must meet prior, and in order to be allowed to be assessed against MSC’s environmental and chain of custody standards.
Jackie is not the head of PR, she is senior PR manager for MSC’s US team."
The Outlaw Ocean Project emailed the MSC:
"Since we were last in contact with you, we have spoken with several academics and labor rights experts about the role of social audits, corporate social responsibility programs and ethical certifications as industry tools for detecting labor abuses in the seafood supply chain. We have compiled their insights below together with relevant recent research on the topic and have some further questions for the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). The experts consulted for this included: Dr. Jessica Sparks, Assistant Professor in the Division of Agriculture, Food and Environment at Tufts University; Dr. Katrina Nakamura, Labor Safe Screen and the Sustainability Incubator; and Chris Williams of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF).
As before, we very much appreciate your continued engagement and discussion on the issues impacting workers throughout the seafood supply chain, and we would be very interested to hear your views on the below details as well as any updates you have on your investigation.
Social audits: ‘Profoundly flawed and ineffective’ A growing body of academic research has found that social audits and industry certifications fail to adequately protect workers as they do not detect, address or prevent labor abuses. The findings of these reports and the views expressed by the experts we spoke to raised questions over the ongoing reliance by the MSC – and the seafood industry more widely – on social audits and voluntary adherence to corporate social responsibility programs, with researchers saying that neither is considered an effective worker- driven due diligence tool effective at identifying labor abuses. “Study after study has found that tools like social auditing and ethical certification are profoundly flawed and ineffective when it comes to the worst forms of labor exploitation,” Genevieve LeBaron, professor of politics at the University of Sheffield, said in an article for the Thomson Reuters Foundation. “Investigations measuring whether and to what extent corporate social responsibility commitments – such as to living wages, ending gender-based violence, or promoting human rights – continuously find little evidence that standards are being realized on the ground.” One of the key failings in the methodology of audits and certs is that they do not rely on input from workers, as researchers from the University of Nottingham found in their analysis of auditable standards and industry certificates relating to the fishing industry: “While these approaches may build transparency, consensus, and action when setting environmental standards, they disempower workers by allowing outside actors to overshadow worker perspectives or by the outright exclusion of workers from determining what issues need to be addressed and the processes and responsibilities for addressing them,” the researchers said in a paper published in Marine Policy in 2022.
Research shows that audits can compound the problem by giving the misleading impression of workplace practices being fully above board when auditors are instead failing to find or report abusive behaviors. “In other words, a company might be technically complying with an initiative’s standards, but that compliance may be insufficient to address the specific abuse at which the standard is targeted,” the Institute for Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Integrity said in its 2020 report on corporate accountability and human rights. “Thus, harms could persist despite a member being deemed compliant.” This in turn, researchers say, gives consumers and legislators false confidence that industry is adequately addressing forced labor and other workplace abuses without need for further regulatory oversight.
Researchers have also found that the confidential nature of audits means that adverse findings are easier to dismiss or silence, and so offer little support to workers with grievances. “[Audits] come with no meaningful role for workers and their organizations, and virtually no repercussions for the brands when workers’ rights are abused or their safety is put at risk,” openDemocracy has said. “This enables brands to silence findings and walk away if the code of conduct auditors find problems too difficult to fix.”
Our investigation into forced labor in Chinese seafood processing found that all ten of the plants tied to Uyghur forced labor had been certified by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), and four by the Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC). We found evidence of Uyghurs working at processing plants within days of visits from auditors, including in one case on the very same day that an audit was conducted by the leading social auditor, S.G.S. Five of the fifteen plants that our investigation found to be using North Korean workers were certified by the MSC. Social audits were conducted by leading firms in those five plants, three by Intertek and two by S.C.S. One of those plants also passed a social audit conducted by the auditing firm BCI Compliance Group in December 2022. None of the audits detected the use of North Korean labor.
The MSC said that a recent update to their certification program would “provide seafood buyers and consumers with greater assurances” that certified companies did not use forced or child labor, but certificates were issued after all ten processing plants had accepted Uyghurs through government transfers. In response to the findings, the MSC acknowledged it was reliant on social audit, and was now concerned about the “demonstrated limitations of this independent verification, which is evident in some circumstances.” Sedex – the author of the world’s most widely used social audit standard, and the one used in all known audits of plants tied to Uyghur labor – told us that it was “difficult and risky for auditors themselves to explicitly recognise state-imposed forced labor” that “may have been covered up.”
Recent research on social audits has also raised concerns about the independence of auditors. Given that third-party auditors work as contractors and consultants, there is a high risk of conflict of interest for auditors who have an incentive to make, or overlook, particular findings so as to ensure repeat business from various stakeholders. "Therefore, it is important that companies are involved in other types of measures, such as direct engagement with unions and other groups that represent rights holders and participation in credible multi-stakeholder initiatives," the Danish Institute of Human Rights said in a recently-published due diligence guide for companies in the fisheries value chain. On the subject of bolstering audits, Sparks told us: “The gold standard for a social audit would require a legally binding commitment so that a company has to continue to use the same auditing body regardless of their findings (and that investigative/auditing body needs to be highly trained, use investigators that speak the language of the workers, etc.). This is what occurs in the Fair Food Program and other worker-driven social responsibility models.”
Announced audits were of particular concern among the experts we spoke to as an insufficiently robust method of checking worker welfare and accurately gauging conditions because the workplace knows exactly when the auditors are coming on site. As Chris Williams of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) said: “Any audit or inspection that is announced is unlikely to detect problems, it's like telling a drug dealer you are going to raid their property at 6pm next Tuesday; it is only unannounced inspections that are likely to uncover wrongdoing and issues around forced labor.”
‘Worker-led human rights due diligence’ Direct engagement with workers is fundamental to developing and implementing meaningful labor protections, according to myriad recent reports on the topic, including from the Danish Institute of Human Rights in 2024, the International Labour Organization in 2023, and the Institute for Multi- Stakeholder Initiative Integrity in 2020. “Even worker grievance mechanisms tied to social audits do not improve data verifiability or assurances of working conditions,” according to this study in Marine Policy. “This is because the voluntary, non-governmental social governance tools are not associated with meaningful company engagement of workers.” The level of worker engagement in social audits and corporate responsibility programs was a point that came up repeatedly in our discussions with labor rights researchers. They questioned a lack of clear human rights due diligence engagement with workers, and suggested more essential incorporation of workers’ views. Rather than rely on third-party audits such as the widely-used SMETA program, companies “should be steered towards worker-led or centered human rights due diligence that includes workers or unions in the design, monitoring and implementation,” said Williams.
The sudden suspension of trade relations with companies at the center of workplace abuse allegations could leave workers in limbo, the experts warned, and limit the effectiveness of efforts to improve worker conditions. “While this might be an effective solution to eliminating risk in their supply chain, it does not alleviate the harm to workers, and could potentially put them at greater risk,” said Sparks. Williams of the ITF added: “What about protections and remedy for the workers affected?”
Having a grievance procedure in place is a critical tool for hearing directly from workers about issues in the workplace, but that procedure must be carefully designed for the specific context of the workers involved. “The process, for example, must provide timely, affordable, and meaningful access to a procedure that is capable of addressing the violation, and the outcome must repair the harm of the violation,” the Danish Institute of Human Rights report said. “Ultimately, the question of whether harms against rights holders are, or could be, remediated by a remedial process is the central inquiry when examining the adequacy and effectiveness of remedial processes.” The experts we spoke to also emphasized the importance of designing grievance mechanisms with which workers can safely and effectively engage. Sparks said important elements to consider are: how workers prefer to report grievances, if cultural factors have been taken into consideration when designing the mechanism, if any barriers to reporting a grievance have been identified, and if the process is trusted by the workers themselves. Grievance mechanisms need to go beyond focusing on severe issues like forced labor, Sparks added, “towards preventing unacceptable conditions or even detecting unacceptable working conditions that may not reach the threshold of forced labor.”
‘China has not hidden its work programs and incentives’ The socio-political context of doing business in China was an important consideration among the experts to whom we spoke. American companies who use Chinese manufacturers or processors should be aware that they are working with partners who operate in a very different regulatory and legal context, they said, one that carries different labor abuse risks, such as North Korean forced labor. They added that U.S. companies should inform and update their trading partners overseas about U.S. regulatory or legislative requirements that could impact on imports from that company, such as the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in 2017 or the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2022. “US companies should not try to defend their purchasing to date on the basis that their suppliers in China should operate as though they are not in China under its regulatory and legal frameworks,” said Nakamura. “It is not sufficient or meaningful for a U.S. company to say that its goods made in China along the North Korean border could not possibly be made by North Korean workers. As a business strategy, it won't work in China because it is not enforceable. China has not hidden its work programs and incentives for North Korean and Uyghur labor transfers in any way.”
This also reflects the findings of our investigation into labor abuses in China’s seafood processing industry, particularly as regards the state-imported forced labor of Uyghurs which is actively promoted by the government, corporate groups and individual companies themselves. Company newsletters by one corporate entity, the Chishan Group, published multiple articles on the practicalities involved, including details of senior management cooperation with the agency involved in state transfers of Uygur labor, the arrival of Uyghur workers at the company’s sites in Shandong province, and special measures to provide a canteen for the Uyghurs.
These issues arising from U.S. businesses engaging factories in China as part of their supply chains reflect concerns in the seafood industry generally. As you may be aware, the Aquaculture Stewardship Council announced last week that it is ceasing its operations and investment in China. The move came in the wake of our reporting on Uyghur and North Korean forced labor in China’s seafood processing industry.
And the social auditing blind spots in China are not just a seafood problem. In December 2020, two shipments of clothes made at a factory in Dandong by North Korean workers were stopped at the port of Newark in violation of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA, which imposes heavy fines on companies that import products tied to North Korean labor. A representative of the clothing manufacturer protested the seizure and submitted two social audits as evidence that no forced labor existed at the plant. An administrative law judge subsequently denied their claim explaining that the social auditors who visited the plants likely made no effort to distinguish nationality so as to check for North Koreans, nor did the auditor speak Korean so as to interview any such workers.
In July 2021, the U.S. State Department said in a business advisory that social audits, especially in China, are inadequate for identifying forced labor because auditors are commonly detained or harassed, audits often rely on government translators, and workers face reprisals for reporting abuses. And in November 2023, U.S. Customs and Border Protection advised companies that a social audit can only be used as credible evidence clearing a company accused of forced labor if it was unannounced, addressed all indicators of forced labor, and conducted interviews in workers’ native languages. These conditions are rarely met for social audits conducted in China, according to various human rights groups such as the Worker Rights Consortium, which offered testimony before a Senate hearing in February 2023.
Ultimately, social audits and industry certifications are just two elements in a wider systemic problem of companies relying on corporate social responsibility to address industry abuses and shortcomings without making structural changes that can have a meaningful impact on labor conditions, according to researchers. As OpenDemocracy put it: “The same models get tried and tried again, yielding disappointing results, yet advocates of CSR [corporate social responsibility] continue to declare that the next time will be different.”
“Social audits are designed to show the firm in a good light, not a bad light,” Nakamura told us. “By design and intent, social standards are market-based promotional instruments used to deflect liability and not problem-solving or investigative tools to enforce labor and trade laws or detect violations.”
Questions for the MSC:
-
Many of the experts we spoke to said there are certain issues in China that are too politically sensitive to raise, such as human rights generally or more specifically the treatment of North Korean or Uyghur workers. We’ve been told by experts that if auditors raise those hot button issues in writing or otherwise there’s a very good chance that the firm conducting the audits will not be allowed to continue operating in China. Will you comment on this inherent challenge and the way that these issues are supposed to be policed?
-
Many of the prior questions we’ve asked the MSC about audits concern actions that may not be feasible in China because of the nature of the government there. If this is true and indeed direct interviews with workers and unannounced spot checks are not permitted, has the MSC considered relocating its work outside of China?
-
In your email of July 5, 2023, you described the role of labor audits in MSC certification as follows: “We select certificate holders for MSC commissioned labor audits based on a statistically random sample. One of the four sites which opted for self-assessment, one was selected for a random audit and this did not raise any issues with forced labor. The random audits can be carried out using one of the five identified providers[i] or another provider of which we approve. As these are relatively new requirements, we are trying to identify the best provider and tool to use, but the intention is the same: to identify whether there are any issues with forced labor.” Flaws in the underlying auditing system imply that there is probably need for a broader review of all MSC-certified plants. Plants had documented cases of forced labor on the premises, but the auditing that should have caught the presence of those workers clearly failed. Does the MSC have any plans to undertake such a review?
-
Some researchers have said there’s an inherent conflict of interest in the structure of auditing whereby the companies being audited are paying the auditing firms to do that work. This has been criticized as a system in which firms are being paid to police their own clients. What does the MSC think can be done to ensure that those conducting the audits are sufficiently independent of the companies and plants that they’re supposed to be policing?
-
How does the MSC check or monitor auditor independence to address potential conflicts of interest? When, and how, does the MSC review third-party auditing standards or auditor training to determine if they are fit for purpose or if they need to be remodeled?
-
Given gaps identified in the MSC self-assessments and third-party audits (for example, no requirement to identify migrant workers’ places of origin even where there is a risk of state-imposed forced labor), what has the MSC done, or is doing, to bridge such gaps? Has the MSC raised the issue of these gaps with the auditing providers approved by the MSC? More generally, what is the MSC doing to improve third-party audits?
-
We’ve heard from experts and industry insiders that plants are frequently informed about an upcoming audit which is supposed to be ‘unannounced’ and that unannounced audits are not possible in practice in China, thereby fundamentally undermining the basic premise of such an audit. Does the MSC have any proposals for addressing this?
-
What are the consequences, if any, following the discovery of previously undetected unacceptable work conditions missed by third-party audit? And what remedy does the MSC offer the affected workers?
-
Does the MSC carry out any monitoring or checks to see if auditors conducting audits for MSC certification are aware of any barriers which could deter workers from disclosing abusive practices or mistreatment? Does the MSC take any steps to help identify and remove these barriers?
-
Aside from audits, is the MSC considering or implementing any other tools to support the protection of human rights and prevention of labor abuses?
-
Does the MSC engage with any worker organizations, unions or federations as part of its human rights efforts? Was there any worker input in developing the MSC’s eligibility requirements on forced labor or the MSC’s chain of custody standard?
-
Does the MSC have procedures to respond to human need with direct assistance when such need is detected at sites certified by the MSC?"
The MSC replied: "MSC is an environmental not-for-profit whose mission is to end overfishing. While this is our main purpose, we do support global efforts to tackle forced and child labor in seafood supply chains. However, as your email demonstrates, there is no simple or single answer to these complex and difficult issues. In 2022, MSC updated its pre-entry requirements to our program, relating to forced and child labor. In some circumstances, processors were required to provide an audit from a credible third-party labor scheme. In the light of recent events, we are now revisiting these requirements. In part, this is due to the fact that one of the main providers of these audits recently acknowledged their limitations in identifying forced labor. The environmental challenges facing the ocean are, frankly speaking, enormous. We believe the greatest impact that MSC can make is to continue to focus on this global challenge through our environmental standard setting and ecolabelling program. Delivering progress in sustainable fishing will support the livelihoods of communities around the world. However, we also understand the importance of labor issues for seafood supply chains, and we are exploring a revised approach to forced and child labor– one which is both practical , supports global efforts and is in line with MSC’s environmental remit.
We will announce the outcome of this, in due course."